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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Matthew Boyd Davis entered a conditional plea of guilty to possession of
methamphetamine, reserving his right to appeal the district court’s denial of his motion to
suppress. On appeal, Mr. Davis asserts his Fourth Amendment rights were violated when an
officer stopped the vehicle he was driving, without sufficient factual basis to support a
reasonable, articulable suspicion that he had committed any offense.

The district court’s

contrary conclusion was in error and its decision denying suppression should be reversed.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Boise City Police Officer Trevor Stokes was in his patrol vehicle parked at the Texaco
gas station at the intersection of Vista Avenue and Sunrise Rim, at about 2:45 in the morning.
(Tr., p.8, L.23 – p.9, L.12.) He observed a red Chevy Cavalier pull past the gas pumps and exit
from the gas station parking lot, but he did not see the vehicle come to a complete stop, or notice
its brake lights, before he saw it pull onto the roadway. (Tr., p.9, L.15 – p.10, L.6.) Officer
Stokes decided to follow it. (Tr., p.10, Ls.15-16.)
As he followed the Cavalier down the well-lighted Vista Avenue, Officer Stokes thought
the vehicle did not have operational taillights. (Tr., p.10, Ls.17-21, p.17, Ls.1-6.) Because he
knew his patrol car’s headlights sometimes gave a reflective glare on other vehicles’ taillights,
Officer Stokes “flicked off” his own headlights “to confirm what he was seeing.” (Tr., p.11,
Ls.3-9.) Officer Stokes then turned on his overhead red and blue lights and initiated a traffic
stop. (Tr., p.11, p.12-14.) Officer Stokes later testified that he stopped the Cavalier because he
had observed two infractions: the vehicle’s failure to come to a complete stop before entering
the roadway, and driving without operational taillights. (Tr. p.10, L.14 – p.11, L.14.)
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As the result of the stop, Officer Stokes contacted Mr. Davis, the driver, and discovered
his license was suspended; an open container in the vehicle was observed, and when Mr. Davis
attempted to flee, he was tackled, arrested and searched, and during the search the police
discovered methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia. (See R., pp.47-48.) The State filed an
Amended Complaint charging Mr. Davis with possession of methamphetamine, a felony, along
with several misdemeanors: resisting an officer, possession of an open alcohol container,
possession of drug paraphernalia, and driving without privileges. (R. pp.21-22.) The State later
filed an Information alleging the same charges, following a preliminary hearing. (R., pp.27-28.)
In separate filings, Officer Stokes cited Mr. Davis with the two infractions he reportedly
observed. (See R., pp.41-44.) Mr. Davis was tried before a magistrate and subsequently found
to be not guilty of either traffic offense. (See R., pp.41-44.)
Following his acquittals on the traffic infractions, Mr. Davis filed a motion to suppress in
the present case. (R., pp.39-42.) He claimed Officer Stokes had unlawfully stopped him,
without reasonable suspicion that he had committed an offense, in violation of his Fourth
Amendment rights against unreasonable seizures, and that the evidence subsequently discovered
should be excluded as fruit of the officer’s unlawful conduct. (R., pp.39-51.) Mr. Davis pointed
to the fact he had been tried before a magistrate and found “not guilty” of the two traffic offenses
for which he reportedly was stopped. (R., pp.39-40, 42-44.)1 Alternatively, he argued that

1

At the subsequent evidentiary hearing held on his suppression motion, Mr. Davis asked the
district court to take judicial notice of the transcript of the prior court trial proceedings, pursuant
to Idaho Rule of Evidence 201(a). (Tr., p.26, L.16 – p.29, L.21.) The State objected, arguing
that the magistrate’s conclusions that the offenses were not proved beyond a reasonable doubt
were irrelevant to the question of whether Officer Stokes’ observations provided an adequate
factual basis to support a reasonable suspicion, and that the transcript testimony from the prior
proceeding was inadmissible hearsay. (Tr., p.30, Ls.17-31 – p.17, L.24.) The district court
sustained the State’s objection. (Tr., p.30, L.5 – p.31, L.17.) Mr. Davis does not challenge that
2

Officer Stokes’ testimony at the suppression hearing was unreliable and not credible, and
otherwise insufficient to provide the objective factual basis for a reasonable suspicion that he had
committed either of the infractions. (R., pp.39-42.)
The district court denied Mr. Davis’ suppression motion. The district court concluded that
the standard used by the magistrate to find Mr. Davis “not guilty” of the traffic offenses was a
different and higher standard than the reasonable suspicion standard applicable to justify the
traffic stop, and agreed with the State that the traffic stop still could be constitutionally
reasonable even if the State failed ultimately failed to prove the infractions beyond a reasonable
doubt. (Tr., p.39, Ls.12-13.) The district court went on to find that, based on Officer Stokes’
testimony at the suppression hearing, the State had carried its burden of establishing reasonable
articulable suspicion. (R., p.40, Ls.1-20.)
Mr. Davis entered a conditional guilty plea to possessing a controlled substance,
reserving his right to appeal the denial of his suppression motion. (Tr., p.41, Ls.14-24.) In
exchange, the State agreed to dismiss the remaining counts and to recommend probation.
(Tr., p.42, Ls.8-13.) In accordance with the parties’ agreement, the district court entered a
judgment convicting Mr. Davis of possession a controlled substance, gave him a suspended
sentence of seven years, with two years fixed, and placed him on probation. (R., pp.76-78.)
Mr. Davis filed a timely Notice of Appeal. (R., p.88.)

ruling on appeal. See State v. Lemons, 158 Idaho 971 (2015) (holding that judicial notice applies
to adjudicative facts, not background facts.)
3

ISSUE
Did the district court err in denying Mr. Davis’s motion to suppress?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred In Denying Mr. Davis’s Motion To Suppress

A.

Introduction
When the State seeks to justify a traffic stop based on the officer’s reasonable articulable

suspicion, the State bears the burden to establish the objective factual basis to support the
officer’s reasonable suspicion that the driver committed a traffic offense or is otherwise engaging
in criminal activity. Mr. Davis submits the State failed to meet that burden in his case. The
district court’s contrary conclusion was in error and its decision to deny suppression should be
reversed.
B.

Standard Of Review
In reviewing a district court order granting or denying a motion to suppress evidence, the

standard of review is bifurcated. State v. Perez, 164 Idaho 626, 627 (2019). This Court will
accept the trial court’s findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous. Id. Decisions regarding
the credibility of witnesses, weight to be given to conflicting evidence, and factual inferences to
be drawn are also within the discretion of the trial court. State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 811
(2009).

However, this Court freely reviews the trial court’s application of constitutional

principles in light of the facts found. Perez, 164 Idaho at 627. Determinations of reasonable
suspicion are reviewed de novo, while findings of fact that support a determination of reasonable
suspicion are reviewed for clear error. Id.
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C.

The State Failed To Carry Its Burden To Show That The Officer Possessed Sufficient
Facts To Support A Reasonable Suspicion That Mr. Davis Had Committed A Traffic
Violation
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that “[t]he right of the

people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures, shall not be violated.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. “Generally, evidence obtained as a
result of an unreasonable search or seizure must be suppressed.” State v. Neal, 159 Idaho 912,
919 (2018).
“Traffic stops constitute seizures under the Fourth Amendment.” State v. Henage, 143
Idaho 655, 658 (2007) (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979)). “The seizure of a
vehicle’s occupants in order to investigate a traffic violation is a ‘reasonable seizure’ under the
Fourth Amendment so long as the seizing officer had reasonable suspicion that a violation had
occurred.” State v. Linze, 161 Idaho 605, 608 (2016) (citing Rodriguez v. United States, 575
U.S. 348 (2016)). Reasonable suspicion must be based on specific, articulable facts and the
rational inferences that can be drawn from those facts. State v. Perez, 164 Idaho 626, 629
(2019); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 325 (1968). Reasonable suspicion requires more than a mere
hunch or “inchoate and unparticularized suspicion.” Bishop, 146 Idaho at 810-11. “Whether an
officer possessed reasonable suspicion is evaluated based on the totality of the circumstances
known to the officer at or before the time of the stop.” Id. at 811. The burden is on the State to
prove that the search or seizure in question was reasonable. Id.
Mr. Davis asserts that, contrary to the district court’s conclusions, the facts established by
Officer Stokes’ testimony were inadequate to provide a reasonable suspicion that Mr. Davis had
committed either of the offenses.
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1.

The Objective Facts Do No Support A Reasonable Suspicion That Mr. Davis
Committed A Violation Of Idaho Code § 49-651

In support of the officer’s actions, the State presented testimony from Officer Stokes.
Officer Stokes testified that he “saw a red Chevy Cavalier exit from the gas station parking lot on
to Vista,” that “it didn’t come to a complete stop prior to exiting from the gas station parking lot
out onto Vista,” and “it just looked like a very slow roll out of the parking lot” and “I didn’t
observe brake lights.” (Tr., p.9, L.15 – p.10, L.6.) Officer Stokes estimated the vehicle was
moving at about 5 to 10 miles per hour. (Tr., p.15, L.20.)
However, on cross-examination by defense counsel, and in response to the subsequent
questioning by the district court, Officer Stokes’ revealed there were gasoline pumps and an
overhang between the area where he had parked and the exit/driveway leading onto the street,
and that the pumps blocked a portion of his view. (Tr., p.14, Ls.5-23, p.20, Ls.3-13.) Officer
Stokes further conceded that, because his view was obstructed, the vehicle could have stopped
before it turned onto Vista and if so, he would not have seen it stop. (Tr., p.20, Ls.8-13.) Officer
Stokes also testified that the obstructed area was “several feet behind the actual
sidewalk/driveway portion,” and only the driveway/sidewalk area was within his field of view.
(Tr., p.21, Ls.1-19.)
Mr. Davis asserts that Officer Stokes’ observations are inadequate to support a reasonable
suspicion that Mr. Davis violated Idaho Code § 49-651.
49-651. EMERGING FROM ALLEY, DRIVEWAY OR BUILDING. The
driver of a vehicle emerging from an alley, building, private road or driveway
within a business or residential district shall stop the vehicle immediately prior
to driving onto a sidewalk or onto the sidewalk area extending across the alley,
building entrance, or driveway, or in the event there is no sidewalk area, shall
stop at the point nearest the highway to be entered where the driver has a view
of approaching traffic.
(Emphasis added.)
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Officer Stokes’ testimony does not establish where the “sidewalk” or “sidewalk area”
began; additionally, given that his view was obstructed a few feet back, the officer would not
have seen the brake lights on the rear end of any vehicle that had stopped immediately prior to
the sidewalk, as the rear end of the vehicle would have been obstructed by the pumps. (Tr., p.10,
Ls.6-21.) Thus, the “objective facts” observed by the officer – that he did not observe the
vehicle stop or see the brake lights – do not provide a sufficient factual basis to provide a
reasonable suspicion of a violation.
2.

The Objective Facts Are Insufficient To Support A Reasonable Suspicion That
Mr. Davis Committed A Violation Of Idaho Code § 49-906, Related To Tail
Lamps

Officer Stokes’ testimony does not provide an objective factual basis sufficient to
support a reasonable suspicion that the vehicle’s taillights were not operational as required by
I.C. § 49-906.2 Officer Stokes testified that, as he pulled onto Vista Avenue to follow the

2

The statute provides:
49-906. TAIL LAMPS. (1) Every motor vehicle, trailer, semitrailer, and pole
trailer, and any other vehicle which is being drawn at the end of a train of
vehicles, shall be equipped with at least one (1) tail lamp mounted on the rear,
which when lighted as required, shall emit a red light plainly visible from a
distance of five hundred (500) feet to the rear. In the case of a train of vehicles
only the tail lamp on the rearmost vehicle need actually be seen from the
distance specified. Every mentioned vehicle, other than a truck tractor,
registered in this state and manufactured or assembled after December 31,
1955, shall be equipped with at least two (2) tail lamps mounted on the rear,
which when lighted as required, shall comply with the provisions of this
section.
(2) Every tail lamp upon every vehicle shall be located at a height of
not more than seventy-two (72) inches nor less than twenty (20) inches.
(3) Any tail lamp shall be wired so to be lighted whenever the head
lamps or auxiliary driving lamps are lighted.
(4) Nothing herein shall prohibit the display on any vehicle thirty (30)
years or older of tail lamps containing a blue or purple insert lens not to
exceed one (1) inch in diameter, provided the tail lamp or lamps otherwise
comply with the requirements of this section.
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Cavalier, he did not notice the vehicle’s operating taillights. (Tr., p.16, Ls.12-21.) He also
testified that, because he knew his patrol car’s headlights sometimes gave a reflective glare on
other vehicles’ taillights, he “flicked off” his own headlights “to confirm what he was seeing.”
(Tr., p.11, Ls.3-9.)

However, Officer Stokes’ testimony that he did not see the vehicle’s

taillights working (Tr., p.10, L.25 – p.26, L.3), appears to conflict with his testimony that wanted
to “confirm” that his own headlights were “giving a reflective glare” on the vehicle’s taillights.
(Tr., p.11, Ls.3-9.) Moreover, and as Officer Stokes agreed, Vista Avenue was “well lit” that
night (Tr. p.17, Ls.1-8), a fact defense counsel suggested would make it difficult to determine
whether taillights were illuminated (Tr. p.17, Ls.1-8). And yet Officer Stokes told the district
court he was “a hundred percent sure” there were no operating taillights. (Tr., p.18, Ls.14-23.)
Notably, Officer Stokes did not say he stopped the vehicle for having dimly-lit taillights; he
stopped the vehicle for having non-operational taillights. (Tr., p.11, Ls.11-12.)
Officer Stokes’ testimony was the sole evidence offered by the State to carry its burden
of justifying the warrantless stop. (See generally Tr., p.6, L.23 – p.23, L.2.) Mr. Davis submits
that the facts testified to by Officer Stokes do not establish that the officer observed a traffic
infraction or other law violation and are therefore adequate to provide the requisite factual basis
to support a reasonable suspicion. See Neal, 159 Idaho at 919 (facts observed by officer – e.g.,
crossing fog line – did not establish a violation and therefore failed to provide justification for
the stop). Officer Stokes lacked the constitutionally required reasonable suspicion to conduct the
traffic stop, and his conduct violated Mr. Davis’s Fourth Amendment rights. Suppression should
have been granted.
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Davis respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court’s order denying
his motion to suppress, vacate his judgment of conviction, and remand his case to the district
court for further proceedings.
DATED this 18th day of December, 2019.

/s/ Kimberly A. Coster
KIMBERLY A. COSTER
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
E-Service: ecf@ag.idaho.gov

/s/ Evan A. Smith
EVAN A. SMITH
Administrative Assistant
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